What if Russia abandoned its bases in Syria?

Premise: At the moment, there are no clear signs indicating that Russia is abandoning Syria, but considering recent developments, a “Plan B” cannot be ruled out.

Russia’s two main bases in Syria are Latakia, which hosts a significant airbase with aircraft from both the Air Force (Su-24, Su-25, Su-30, and Su-34) and the Navy (notably the long-range maritime patrol Il-38), and the naval base in Tartus.

Tartus is critical for Moscow as it is Russia’s only naval base in the Mediterranean, even more so after the closure of the Turkish Straits following the aggression against Ukraine and the isolation of the Black Sea Fleet.

In recent years, the presence at Tartus has fluctuated and is now limited to a handful of surface vessels and a single submarine. Although naval activity has been relatively subdued in recent months, this presence remains strategically invaluable, and Moscow cannot afford to abandon it at this stage.

🇷🇺Med Sea Flotilla🇷🇺
50cm 📷 from the port of 🇸🇾Tartus on 30 November 2024

Both Gorshkov class frigates, Admiral Grigorovich, Kilo class Novorossiysk and oilers Yelnya & Vyazma are in port

… and Landsat 8-9 📷 from 1 December 2024 indicate the vessels did not move overnight pic.twitter.com/V60swKWRS4

— MT Anderson (@MT_Anderson) December 2, 2024

However, the situation has escalated dramatically in recent days, as the advance of jihadist rebels has overwhelmed Assad’s forces and pushed southward, indirectly threatening Russian bases in the area.

The possibility of abandoning these bases is no longer unrealistic and would have significant geopolitical implications.

At present, there are no signs of an imminent withdrawal of Russian naval forces from Tartus, despite the departure of the tanker Yelnya (likely returning to Russia after being replaced by the tanker Vyazma). Nevertheless, the situation could change in the coming days—or even hours.

The closure of the Latakia airbase would deprive Russia of the ability to deploy its aerial assets in the Mediterranean. While this may be a lesser problem for the Air Force, it would be a much greater issue for the Navy, as it would lose essential air support—crucial in a hostile theater like the Mediterranean, where NATO member states dominate the northern coast.

The Navy would face an even greater challenge if forced to abandon the Tartus port. Without a homeport, Russian vessels would be unable to maintain a permanent presence in the Mediterranean, limiting themselves to brief and largely symbolic operations without real military significance.

In such a scenario, attention would inevitably shift to the only country currently capable of providing a viable alternative to Syrian bases: Libya.

In recent years, Russian naval visits to ports in Cyrenaica, particularly Tobruk, have become more frequent, though these visits have been brief and without practical implications. However, Tobruk already serves as a logistical hub for Russian operatives in Libya and has minimal infrastructure that could potentially support military units on a medium-term basis.

A similar case could be made for the Air Force, which could likely find a base to station its aircraft (MiG-29s piloted by Russian contractors are already operational in Libya). However, the distance from Russia and restricted airspace could hamper any effective deployment.

Nevertheless, relocating Russian ships to Libya would raise alarm among NATO countries. Strategically, a base in Libya would pose a greater threat than one in Syria. Eastern Libya lies just a few hundred kilometers from NATO’s most important naval and air base in the eastern Mediterranean (Souda Bay) and would endanger Western interests in the region.

What will happen next?
Will Russia truly abandon its bases in Syria?
Will NATO allow Haftar to welcome the Russians with open arms?

Only time will tell, but such a scenario would undoubtedly open the door to completely unpredictable developments.